Husserl

Husserl's anti-psychologism

I've noticed quite a few visitors have arrived looking for information about Husserl. My earlier post on Husserl and transcendental idealism has been quite popular. So, I thought I would make available some of the notes I made and lectures I gave when I was teaching Husserl's Phenomenology at Sydney University in 2006. Although I'll only be posting my own work, this material owes a great debt to Carleton (Bruin) Christensen, whose lectures I had access to in preparing the course. My writing on Husserl is nowhere near as sophisticated as Bruin's, but I hope it will be useful to some of you nonetheless. This first piece tries to introduce the Logical Investigations by explaining how the need to resist psychologism can inspire phenomenology, without phenomenology amounting to a logicist rejection of psychology.

Husserl's Transcendental Idealism

Husserl thought he had gotten beyond the traditional realism/idealism debate, but he consistently held the view that phenomenology implied a transcendental idealism.
In this very dense post, which I actually wrote a long time ago (June 2006), I try to cash out how transcendental idealism differs from its traditional/mundane cousin, and explain why Husserl's transcendental phenomenology isn't dependent on formal justification for its legitimacy, and so can't be ignored by rebutting any or all of these justifications, no matter how regrettable they may be.

Syndicate content